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Pryor v. Municipal Court: California's
Narrowing Definition of Solicitation for
Public Lewd Conduct
By Lawrence Carl Levine*
California Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a),1 declares
that every person who "solicits anyone to engage in or who engages
in lewd or dissolute conduct in any public place or in any place
open to the public or exposed to public view" is guilty of a misde-
meanor.2 Since the enactment of section 647(a) in 1961, the courts
have struggled to interpret the terms "lewd or dissolute" as used in
the section. These ambiguous terms have been subject to several
conflicting interpretations leading to the discriminatory enforce-
ment of section 647(a) against homosexual men.-
In Pryor v. Municipal Court,4 the California Supreme Court
acknowledged the discriminatory enforcement and conflicting in-
terpretations of section 647(a), putting the statute through a rigor-
ous vagueness analysis. Deeming the phrase "lewd or dissolute con-
duct" unconstitutionally vague, the court presented its new
* B.A., 1976, Allegheny College. Member, Third Year Class.
1. This section must be carefully distinguished from California Penal Code § 647a,
which proscribes lewd acts with a minor. See People v. Hensel, 233 Cal. App. 2d 834, 835
n.1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 865, 866 (1965) (first reported appellate case concerning § 647(a), in which
the trial court confused the two sections).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West 1970).
3. The vast majority of section 647(a) arrests have involved male homosexual activity.
See generally Copilow & Coleman, Enforcement of Section 647(a) of the California Penal
Code by the Los Angeles Police Department (1972) (unpublished); Toy, Update: Enforce-
ment of Section 647(a) of the California Penal Code by the Los Angeles Police Department
(July 19, 1974) (unpublished); Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An
Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 643 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Project].
The great majority of the arrests have resulted from the use of male undercover police
officers. See Project, supra, at 691 n.30.
4. 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
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definitions of the terms:
The terms "lewd" and "dissolute" in this section are synonymous,
and refer to conduct which involves the touching of the genitals,
buttocks, or female breast for the purpose of sexual arousal, grati-
fication, annoyance or offense, if the actor knows or should know
of the presence of persons who may be offended by this conduct.
The statute prohibits such conduct only if it occurs in any public
place or in any place open to the public or exposed to public view;
it further prohibits the solicitation of such conduct to be per-
formed in any public place or in any place open to the public or
exposed to public view.8
This Note discusses Pryor v. Municipal Court, emphasizing
both the tripartite vagueness analysis used by the court and the
probable effect of the court's holding. The Note first examines the
historical foundation of Penal Code section 647(a) and the case law
interpreting the section. Special attention is given to the difficul-
ties surrounding the early interpretation of the solicitation pro-
scription in section 647(a) and to the effect of the Consenting
Adults Acts on the statute. The Note next discusses the decision of
the California Supreme Court in Pryor. After analyzing the process
used by the court in its determination of the vagueness of section
647(a) and the foundation for the court's new construction of the
section, the Note examines two questions raised by the ambiguity
of the court's holding: first, whether actual presence of a poten-
tially offendable person is mandated by the holding or whether
likely presence is sufficient; and second, whether the arresting po-
lice officer can also be the required offended person. These ques-
tions are discussed in the context of the arbitrary and discrimina-
tory enforcement of section 647(a) and the context of the need to
restrict further the solicitation proscription of the section.7 The
Note concludes that Pryor is an important step toward limiting
state involvement in the realm of morality but warns that the deci-
sion may be weakened unless the court soon clarifies its holding.
5. Id. at 256-57, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
6. See notes 40-43 & accompanying text infra.
7. Section 647(a) includes prohibitions against both performing public lewd acts (the
engaging portion) and soliciting for public lewd acts (the solicitation portion). Pryor was
arrested for soliciting a public lewd act and, although both parts of the statute are closely
related, the emphasis of the Note is on the solicitation portion of § 647(a).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
California Penal Code Section 647(a)
Historical Background
Section 647 of California's first comprehensive criminal code,
promulgated in 1872, set forth the state's vagrancy statute.8 The
section was revised several times, with subdivision 5 of the 1955
amended version providing that "[e]very lewd or dissolute person
... [i]s a vagrant."9 This vagrancy proscription punished people
8. Section 647 of the Penal Code of 1872 was originally passed in 1863 as part of Cali-
fornia's statutory laws. The section stated: "All persons (except California Indians) without
visible means of living, who have the physical ability to work, and who do not, for the space
of ten days, seek employment nor labor when employment is offered them; all healthy beg-
gars who solicit alms as a business; all persons who roam about from place to place without
any lawful business; all idle or dissolute persons, or associate of known thieves, who wander
about the streets at late or unusual hours of the night, or who lodge in any barn, shed, shop,
outhouse, vessel, or place, other than such is kept for lodging purposes, without the permis-
sion of the owner or party entitled to the possession thereof; all lewd and dissolute persons,
who live in and about houses of ill fame; all common prostitutes, and common drunkards,
may be committed to jail, and sentenced to hard labor, for such time as the Court before
whom they are convicted shall think proper, not exceeding ninety days." Cal. Stats. 1863,
ch. 525, at § 770.
9. The full text of § 647, as amended in 1955 and prior to its major revision effective
in 1961, provided: "1. Every person (except a California Indian) without visible means of
living who has the physical ability to work, and who does not seek employment nor labor
when employment is offered him; or, 2. Every beggar who solicits alms as a business, or, 3.
Every person who roams about from place to place without any lawful business; or, 4. Every
person known to be a pickpocket, thief, burglar or confidence operator, either by his own
confession, or by his having been convicted of any such offenses, and having no visible or
lawful means of support, when found loitering around any steamboat landing, railroad de-
pot, banking institution, broker's office, place of amusement, auction room, store, shop or
crowded thoroughfare, car, or omnibus, or any public gathering or assembly, or, 5. Every
lewd or dissolute person, or every person who loiters in or about public toilets in public
parks; or, 6. Every person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of the
night, without visible or lawful business; or, 7. Every person who lodges in any barn, shed,
shop, outhouse, vessel, or place other than such as is kept for lodging purposes, without the
permission of the owner or party entitled to the possession thereof; or, 8. Every person who
lives in and about houses of ill-fame; or, 9. Every person who acts as a runner or capper for
attorneys in and about police courts or city prisons; or, 10. Every common prostitute; or, 11.
Every common drunkard; or, 12. Every person who loiters, prowls or wanders upon the pri-
vate property of another, in the nighttime, without visible or lawful business with the owner
or occupant thereof; or who while loitering, prowling or wandering upon the private prop-
erty of another, in the nighttime, peeks in the door or window of any building or structure
located thereon and which is inhabited by human beings, without visible or lawful business
with the owner or occupants thereof; Is a vagrant, and is punishable by a fine of not exceed-
ing five hundred dollars ($500), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment." Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 169, § 2, at 638-39
(repealed 1961) (emphasis added).
The terms "lewd or dissolute" probably originated in the description "loose and disso-
lute" found as early as 1656 in Cromwell's statute (Commonwealth, ch. 21). Sherry, Va-
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for their status, not for their conduct, 10 and thus ignored the other-
wise indispensable elements of a crime: act and intent." Although
section 647(5)'s criminalization of lewd or dissolute status was not
limited to persons engaging in lewd or dissolute sexual conduct,
most cases under the statute concerned people engaged in sexually
related activity.
The preservation of societal order was believed to depend
upon the strict enforcement of section 647. The California Court of
Appeal summarized this sentiment:
Society recognizes that vagrancy is a parasitic disease, which, if
allowed to spread, will sap the life of that upon which it feeds. To
prevent the spread of the disease, the carrier must be reached. In
order to discourage, and, if possible, to eradicate vagrancy, our
Legislature has enacted a statute defining vagrant persons and
penalizing them according to its terms.
2
California courts repeatedly upheld section 647 in general, and
subdivision 5 of the section in particular, against constitutional at-
tack. The statute was held to be a legitimate exercise of the state's
police power' s and definite enough to withstand a vagueness
challenge. 4
grants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALF. L. Ray. 557,
565 n.56 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Sherry].
10. See People v. Allington, 103 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 911, 919, 229 P.2d 495, 500-01
(1951): "The punishment provided by section 647 is not for doing, but for being, for being a
vagrant."
11. See W. LAFAvH & A. ScOTr, CmRMINAL LAW § 24, at 175 (1972).
12. People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 329, 229 P.2d 843, 846 (1951) (quoting State
v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 233, 24 P.2d 601, 603 (1933)). In Babb, the court held that the
Penal Code prohibition of sodomy (since repealed) necessarily included a violation of §
647(5), stating. "A single act of lewdness or dissoluteness may be sufficient to constitute a
person a vagrant if it is of such a nature as reasonably to justify an inference that no one
not of lewd or dissolute character would do such an act even once." Id. at 330-31, 229 P.2d
at 846.
However, in People v. Brandt, 306 P.2d 1069 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1956), the
court held that a single act of illicit heterosexual intercourse was not an offense under § 647.
The court explained that a person becomes a vagrant only through the repetition of the
conduct, but noted that in some cases the requisite repetition is inferable from a single act.
Id. at 1071. The court implied that a person who is caught engaging in sodomy only once
must be a vagrant because it can be inferred that "no one not of a lewd or disolute character
would do such an act even once," while a person who is caught visiting a prostitute is not
necessarily a vagrant because repetitious conduct may not be inferred. Id. In essence, the
court imposed a greater inference of lewdness upon homosexual acts than it applied to het-
erosexual activity.
13. E.g., People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 328-29, 229 P.2d 843, 845 (1951); In re
McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765, 766, 96 P. 110, 111 (1908).
14. E.g., In re McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765, 96 P. 110 (1908). The court in McCue ex-
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Support for vagrancy statutes began to wane.15 The prior un-
wavering judicial support was altered abruptly by the California
Supreme Court's decision in In re Newbern6 in 1960. In Newbern,
the court held that Penal Code section 647, subdivision 11, which
characterized every "common drunk" as a vagrant, was unconstitu-
tionally vague and incapable of being uniformly enforced.1 7 React-
ing to this decision and to the increasing scholarly attack upon va-
grancy statutes, 8 the California Legislature enacted Penal Code
section 647(a)"9 to replace Penal Code section 647(5).20 The legisla-
plained: "[L]ewdness or dissoluteness [are] often used interchangeably but each. . . ap-
plies to the unlawful indulgence of lust, whether in public or private. . . . The statute,
then, is a valid exercise of police power as to these elements, and it is within the power of
the court to determine whether one charged comes within the class of lewd or dissolute
persons. To say that the Legislature must specify the many evil and corrupt practices which
might constitute one a lewd or dissolute person would often render the enforcement [of
section 647(5)] impossible ..... Id. at 766, 96 P. at 111.
15. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603
(1956); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1203
(1953); Sherry, supra note 9; Note, Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws For Arrest and Detention
of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950). But see Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9
HASTINGs L.J. 237 (1958) (supporting vagrancy laws).
16. 53 Cal. 2d 786, 350 P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1960).
17. The court noted that article I, § 11 of the California Constitution (now art. IV, §
16) requires that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation. 53 Cal. 2d at
797, 350 P.2d at 123, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 371. Further, the court stated that the language of the
subdivision violated due process because it was so unclear that "men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Id. at 792, 350 P.2d at
120, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 368 (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
18. The comments and testimony of Professor Arthur Sherry had an enormous impact
upon the legislature. Speaking before a subcommittee of the Assembly Interim Committee
on the Judiciary in 1958, Professor Sherry labeled the vagrancy law as "seriously defective,
outmoded and very much in need of amendment." Sherry, supra note 9, at 568. Professor
Sherry, in his article on vagrancy statutes, writes: "[T]he vagrancy law is archaic in con-
cept, quaint in phraseology, a symbol of injustice to many and very largely at variance with
prevailing standards of constitutionality .... In these circumstances the time is surely at
hand to modernize the vagrancy concept or, better yet, to abandon it altogether for statutes
which will harmonize with notions of a decent, fair and just administration of criminal jus-
tice .... This may be done by drafting legislation having to do with conduct rather than
status." Id. at 566-67.
In an attempt to incorporate these goals, a tentative draft of a bill was prepared. See
.B. 2712 (1959). Although the bill was passed by the legislature, it was vetoed by the Gov-
ernor at the request of Professor Sherry who felt some of the amendments weakened the
bill. However, in 1961 the bill was reformulated and conformed with the provision recom-
mended by Professor Sherry. The Criminal Justice Committee accepted without change the
recommended § 647(a), which provided: "Any person who engages in lewd or dissolute con-
duct in any public place or in any place open to the public or exposed to public view [is
guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor]." It apparently was during the floor debate
that a solicitation prohibition was added to the Committee's recommended section.
19. See notes 1-2 & accompanying text supra.
November 1980] PRYOR V. MUNICIPAL COURT
tive purpose of this amendment was to cover the subject matter of
existing subsection 5.21 Section 647(a) was designed to depart from
the concept of status and to deal directly with socially harmful
lewd or dissolute conduct.2
In addition to this change from penalizing status to penalizing
conduct, a notable difference between section 647(5) and its later
counterpart, section 647(a), was the addition of a prohibition of
solicitation of lewd or dissolute conduct. With this alteration, sec-
tion 647(a) became California's first noncommercial sexual solicita-
tion prohibition. The language of the solicitation portion of section
647(a)-any person "who solicits anyone to engage in. .. lewd or
dissolute conduct in any public place"-is unclear and presents at
least two tenable interpretations. Section 647(a) could be inter-
preted (1) to prohibit any solicitation made in a public place to
engage in lewd conduct anywhere, or (2) to prohibit any solicita-
tion, whether in a public or private location, to engage in lewd con-
duct in a public place.
Based upon perceptions of the intent of the legislature, Cali-
fornia courts have consistently interpreted the solicitation portion
of section 647(a) as a prohibition of public solicitation for lewd
conduct to be performed anywhere. In People v. Dudley,23 the de-
fendant invited an undercover police officer standing on the side-
walk to his home to engage in oral copulation and sodomy, both
felonies at the time.24 Noting that an earlier case 25 had held that a
20. Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 560, § 2, at 1672. In the same year that § 647(a) was enacted,
the American Law Institute recommended a similar provision which read: "A person com-
mits a petty misdemeanor if he does any lewd act which he knows is likely to be observed by
others who would be affronted or alarmed." MODEL PENAL CODE, § 251.1 (Tent. Draft No.
13, 1961). The suggested requirement that a defendant be aware of the likelihood of af-
fronting observers appears not to have been considered by the California legislative commit-
tee. See 22 ASSEmBLY INTERIM Comm. RaP. No. 1, at 9 (1959-1961).
21. Sherry, supra note 9, at 569. See Project, supra note 3, at 684.
22. Sherry, supra note 9, at 569. Lewd or dissolute conduct is deemed socially harmful
"when it occurs in public view." Id.
23. 250 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 955, 58 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1967), overruled, Pryor v. Munici-
pal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
24. Former Penal Code § 286, prohibiting sodomy, provided: "Every person who is
guilty of the infamous crime against nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than one year." Former Penal Code
§ 288a, proscribing oral copulation, read: "Any person participating in an act of copulating
the mouth of one person with the sexual organ of another is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison for not exceeding 15 years, or by imprisonment in the county jail not to
exceed one year ... ." For a brief discussion of the history and application of these sec-
tions, see Project, supra note 3, at 674-81.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
person making a homosexual solicitation was "lewd or dissolute"
and that the legislative intent was to encompass former section
647(5) proscriptions within section 647(a),"8 the court stated:
We cannot believe the Legislature intended to subject innocent
bystanders, be they men, women or children, to the public blan-
dishments of deviates so long as the offender was smart enough to
say that the requested act was to be done in private. Nor do we
feel the legislators were unaware of the open, flagrant and to de-
cent people disgusting solicitations of sexual activity which have
occurred on the public streets of some of our cities. Moreover, it
is not to be forgotten that to some a homosexual proposition is
inflammatory, which public utterance might well lead to a breach
of the peace.
27
Dudley did not involve a constitutional challenge; the issue was
solely whether the public solicitation of private felonious sexual
acts was proscribed by section 647(a).
The Dudley court's determination that section 647(a) prohib-
ited solicitation to engage in lewd acts either publicly or privately
was followed the next year in People v. Mesa,28 a case involving an
undercover police officer who had engaged in a fifteen minute con-
versation with the defendant at a bar. The officer had asked the
defendant what his "game" was and the defendant had replied
that it was "fun in bed." After the plainclothes officer asked for
and received further clarification, he requested the defendant to
accompany him to the parking lot, whereupon he placed the defen-
dant under arrest. The court stated that, despite the vague word-
ing of the solicitation portion of section 647(a), the statute is not
so vague as to be unenforceable and that it would effectuate the
Penal Code §§ 286 and 288a were repealed by the 1976 enactment of the Consenting
Adults Act. See text accompanying notes 43-47 infra.
25. The Dudley court cited People v. Woodworth, 147 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 831, 305
P.2d 721 (1956). Although Woodworth's conduct was not described in this case, tried under
former § 647(5), it is acknowledged in Dudley that Woodworth was charged with being a
lewd or dissolute person because he made a homosexual solicitation. 250 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
at 958 n.4, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59.
26. See note 21 & accompanying text supra.
27. 250 CaL App. 2d Supp. at 959, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 559. The "engaging" portion of §
647(a) is designed to prohibit "lewd or dissolute" public sexual acts. Although the solicita-
tion portion may be read as a separate part of the subdivision, the purpose of a solicitation
proscription is to assure that the solicited act (public lewd conduct) will not occur. The
court's concern with bothersome solicitations, although tenable from the ambiguous wording
of the statute, does not seem to touch upon the prevention of public lewd conduct.
28. 265 Cal. App. 2d 746, 71 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1968), overruled, Pryor v. Municipal
Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
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legislative purpose underlying its passage.29 The court viewed this
purpose to be the prohibition of conduct which would outrage pub-
lic decency, noting that the legislature believed that public obser-
vation of a "homosexual proposition would engender outrage in the
vast majority of people."30 Although the court briefly referred to
section 647(a)'s proscription of public lewd conduct,31 it did not
mention that the acts solicited were felonies and thus intimated
that the solicitation portion of section 647(a) is broad enough to
encompass any bothersome proposition for any lewd, though not
necessarily felonious, act.
In the only appellate court decision rendered before Pryor in-
volving a constitutional challenge to the solicitation portion of sec-
tion 647(a), the court in Silva v. Municipal Court32 held that sec-
tion 647(a) was not unconstitutionally vague. The court reached
this result by equating "lewd or dissolute" with "obscene" and ar-
gued that because the term "obscene" is not unconstitutionally
vague or uncertain, neither are the terms "lewd" and "dissolute." 33
After a discussion of the obscenity standard, the court concluded:
From all this we reach a definition of the obscene conduct coy-
29. 265 Cal. App. 2d at 748, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 596. The defendant's solicitation was for
sexual acts which were felonies at the time. See note 24 supra.
30. 265 Cal. App. 2d at 751, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
31. Id. at 750, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
32. 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1974). The facts of Silva were not given
beyond a statement that the petitioner was charged "with soliciting another to engage in
such lewd and dissolute conduct." Id. at 736, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 480 (emphasis original).
33. Id. at 736-37, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81. The court founded its reasoning on the
California Supreme Court decision of In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 655 (1968). In Giannini, the court reasoned that a topless dancer would be guilty of a
§ 647(a) violation only if her dancing, presumptively protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments, was "obscene." The court, with Justice Tobriner writing for the majority,
stated that "[a]t least for the present purpose of determining the alleged obscenity of a
dance performed before an audience for entertainment, we interpret, as did the trial court
below, the terms 'lewd' and 'dissolute' as identical to 'obscene', a term... define[d] with as
much precision as legislatures and courts have been able to muster in this complex and
confusing area." Id. at 571 n.4, 446 P.2d at 541, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
Justice Tobriner, again writing for the majority, explained in Pryor v. Municipal Court,
25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979), that in Giannini "we expressly
limited our interpretation of 'lewd or dissolute' as 'obscene' only to ... an activity which
. . . involved 'communication of ideas, impressions and feelings.'" Id. at 246, 599 P.2d at
640, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 334. Thus, Pryor repudiated the use of the obscenity standard in
situations involving the solicitation of a lewd or dissolute act. See also Williemsen, Sex and
The School Teacher, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 839 (1974). "The judicial gloss which adds speci-
ficity to obscenity statutes, however, does not speak to a case involving noncommunicative
conduct; without an audience, there is no one to arouse pruriently or redeem socially." Id. at
859 (discussing the inapplicability of the obscenity test to a Silva situation).
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ered by Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a). It is that sort of
sexual conduct which is "grossly repugnant" and "patently offen-
sive" to "generally accepted notions of what is appropriate" and
decent according to statewide contemporary community stan-
dards. It will ordinarily include conduct found "disgusting, repul-
sive, filthy, foul, abominable [or] loathsome" under those
standards."
This reasoning also led the court to dispense with petitioner's first
amendment challenge to the solicitation portion of section 647(a).
Noting that "obscene" speech is unprotected, the court stated:
[T]he solicitation (in and of itself) of an obscene act will reasona-
bly be deemed obscene conduct or at least a written or oral
description of obscene conduct, and therefore beyond First
Amendment protection. Certainly any solicitation to engage in an
obscene act, to be understood, must include a description of the
proposed conduct.-5
In essence, the court held that a solicitation to engage in an ob-
scene, or lewd or dissolute, act must itself be obscene.3s
The compelling state interest, the court explained, is the pre-
vention of the "dissemination of obscenity [that] 'carries with it a
significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipi-
ents.' ,,s3 Although the statute's concern is with offensive obscene
communications, the court failed to distinguish the solicitation of
illicit acts from the solicitation of noncriminal acts. Moreover, it is
not clear which acts might be so detrimental to the public welfare
that their mere solicitation would be criminal despite the lack of
legal proscription against the acts themselves.
In his concurring opinion in Silva, Justice Sims sought to limit
the application of the solicitation portion of section 647(a) to ille-
gal acts. Although at the time of Silva most forms of private con-
sensual homosexual conduct were illegal,s8 Justice Sims reasoned
that the prohibition of the solicitation of private sexual conduct
should be limited "to a solicitation made in a public place, or in a
34. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 741, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
35. Id. at 737, 115 CaL Rptr. at 481 (emphasis original).
36. The logic of this assumption has been questioned. See Williemsen, Sex and The
School Teacher, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 839, 860 (1974): "As any reader of Masters and
Johnson knows, it is possible to describe sexual acts in such dull and clinical prose as to lull
anyone's prurient interest. And Cole Porter fans might add that graphic description is un-
necessary to a solicitation; in the right context, 'Let's Do It' is sufficient."
37. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 738, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 482 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 18-19 (1973)).
38. See note 24 supra.
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place open to the public, or in a place or manner where the solici-
tation is audible to the public, to engage in a lewd or dissolute act
which is prohibited by law."39 Whether the solicitation of noncrim-
inal acts would continue to be prohibited by section 647(a) was
uncertain.
The Consenting Adults Act"
Although California has never prohibited homosexuality per
se, statutes proscribing sodomy and oral copulation had the effect
of indirectly branding homosexuality as criminal. 1 California
courts consistently refused to interfere with the right of the state
to enact penal statutes proscribing certain sexual contact and have
viewed such enactments as legitimate exercises of the state's power
to promote morality. 2
In 1975, the California Legislature passed the "Consenting
Adults Act" which, among other things, removed all criminal sanc-
tions against acts of sodomy and oral copulation performed in pri-
vate by consenting persons over eighteen years of age.4' The Act
was expected to have a minimal effect upon section 647(a)'s pro-
scription of lewd acts in public because it concerned only private
39. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 742, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 484 (Sims, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
40. Cal. Stats. 1975, ch. 71, at 131; id., ch. 877, at 1957. See generally Note, California
"Consenting Adults" Law: The Sex Act in Perspective, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 439 (1976);
Cohen, Socio-Political Factors Affecting California's Consenting Adults Legislation 1969-
1975 (1976) (unpublished Master's Thesis, available from the Office of the Hon. Willie
Brown, Assemblyperson, San Francisco, California).
41. W. BARNett, SaxuAL FRmmoM AND THE CONsTrruTiON 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as SzxuAL FlDoM].
42. See, e.g., People v. Drolet, 30 Cal. App. 3d 207, 105 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1973). Cf. In re
Weisberg, 215 Cal. 624, 627, 12 P.2d 446, 447 (1932) (state's police power extends to the
preservation of "public safety, health, comfort or good morals"). In Drolet, the court stated
that "[tihe exercise of this power [to proscribe illicit sexual contacts] is a legitimate legisla-
tive function, and the courts do not sit as a super-legislative body to determine the desira-
bility or propriety of statutes enacted by.the Legislature." 30 Cal. App. 3d at 212, 105 Cal.
Rptr. at 826-27. For a list of state statutes prohibiting private consensual sexual conduct
between adults, see Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HAsTiNGs L.J. 799, 949-50 app. (1979).
43. This was the sixth time since 1969 that Assemblyperson Willie Brown introduced
this legislation, also known as the Brown Act. The bill passed the Assembly 45-26, but the
State Senate vote resulted in a tie which was broken by the Lieutenant Governor's vote. See
Cohen, Socio-Political Factors Affecting California's Consenting Adults Legislation 1969-
1975 (1976) (unpublished Master's Thesis, available from the Office of the Hon. Willie
Brown, Assemblyperson, San Francisco, California). With the signature of the Governor,
private adult consensual sexual conduct was no longer criminal in California.
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conduct, whereas section 647(a) expressly prohibits public lewd
conduct. Despite the fact that the Act reflected increasing societal
acceptance of homosexual conduct,4' the Act's effect in terms of
actual law enforcement has been slight, because of the inherent
difficulties in enforcing laws regulating private sexual conduct.
45
The effect which the Consenting Adults Act would have on the
solicitation portion of section 647(a) was not clear. In earlier deci-
sions, the courts had accepted the proposition that section 647(a)
proscribed public solicitation of a "lewd or dissolute" act regard-
less of where the act was to be performed.46 Because those cases
involved the solicitation of an illegal act, there arose a question as
to whether enactment of the Consenting Adults Act precluded
prosecution under section 647(a) for the public solicitation of the
decriminalized acts.47 The dicta of the Silva court, pronouncing
that the state may prohibit the solicitation of acts which, while not
criminal, somehow violate the public welfare,48 became open to
attack.
Post-1976 Section 647(a) Cases
The section 647(a) cases in the years following the passage of
the Consenting Adults Act avoided the difficult problem of defin-
44. Note, "California Consenting Adults" Law: The Sex Act in Perspective, 13 SAN
DIEmo L. REv. 439, 446 (1976). See also Cohen, Socio-Political Factors Affecting California's
Consenting Adults Legislation 1969-1975 (1976) (unpublished Master's Thesis, available
from the Office of the Hon. Willie Brown, Assemblyperson, San Francisco, California).
45. SExuAL FREEDoM, supra note 41, at 17 n.22.
46. See notes 23-39 & accompanying text supra.
47. In response to an inquiry by the legislature during the debate over the Consenting
Adults Act, the Legislative Counsel interpreted the purpose of the solicitation prohibition of
§ 647(a) to be the protection of innocent members of society and the avoidance of breaches
of the peace. These purposes, the opinion concluded, would not be altered by the bill and
the solicitation of the decriminalized acts would continue to be proscribed. *Legislative
Counsel Opinion No. 75-5424 (March 5, 1957). In support of these propositions the Legisla-
tive Counsel cited People v. Mesa, 265 Cal. App. 2d 746, 71 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1968), overruled,
Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979). However,
in Note, California "Consenting Adults" Law: The Sex Act in Perspective, 13 SAN DGo
L. REv. 439, 448 (1976), the author explains that the enactment of the Consenting Adults
Act "may reflect an awareness of the legislature of the gradual societal acceptance of homo-
sexuality .... If such acceptance is the effect of the legalization of homosexual activity,
then the purpose of the solicitation statute is defeated. The solicitation of homosexual activ-
ity would be unlikely to either 'engender outrage' or provoke 'breaches of the peace."' For
an additional theory presented to justify prohibiting solicitation, see notes 104-07 & accom-
panying text infra.
48. See note 37 & accompanying text supra.
November 1980] PRYOR V. MUNICIPAL COURT
ing the scope of the solicitation portion of the statute. These cases,
which involved the engaging portion of section 647(a), did, how-
ever, foreshadow a broader problem with the statute. Conflict arose
among the courts of appeal over the correct interpretation of "lewd
or dissolute."
In Silva v. Municipal Court,9 the First District Court of Ap-
peal equated "lewd or dissolute" with "obscene."50 The Appellate
Department of the San Bernardino Superior Court adopted this
test in People v. Rodrigues,5 1 upholding the section 647(a) convic-
tion of two men observed "kissing, hugging, and sitting, alter-
nately, on each other's laps. '5 2 However, the Second District Court
of Appeal refused to accept the Silva definition. In People v. Wil-
liams,53 the court expressly rejected the Silva obscenity test, not-
ing: "Nowhere in Silva v. Municipal Court, supra, is there any
mention of Loignon, Babb or CALJIC (Misdemeanor) No. 16.402.
We cannot reasonably conclude that our bretheren in the First
District intended so unceremoniously to relegate to oblivion those
long-standing and respected precedents."'
54
Thus, two conflicting interpretations of "lewd or dissolute" as
used in section 647(a) existed. In the Second District Court of Ap-
peal a citizen was not permitted to solicit for or engage in acts
which were "lustful, lascivious, unchaste, wanton, or loose in
morals and conduct." 5 For citizens falling within the jurisdiction
of the First, Fourth, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, however,
a different standard prevailed. These citizens were not permitted
to engage in or solicit sexual conduct which was "grossly repug-
nant" and "patently offensive" to "generally accepted notions of
what is appropriate and decent according to statewide contempo-
rary community standards.158 It was within this confused context
49. 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1974).
50. See notes 32-34 & accompanying text supra.
51. 63 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 133 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1976).
52. Id. at 3-4, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
53. 59 Cal. App. 3d 225, 130 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1976).
54. Id. at 230, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 463. The court was referring to People v. Loignon, 160
Cal. App. 2d 412, 325 P.2d 541 (1958), and People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 229 P.2d
843 (1951), which defined "dissolute" as "loose in morals and conduct; wanton; lewd; de-
bauched." The Williams court, noting those terms were clear, opted for California Jury
Instructions-Criminal (CAIAC) (Misdemeanor) No. 16.402, which equates "lewd or disso-
lute" with "lustful, lascivious, unchaste, wanton, or loose in morals and conduct." 59 Cal.
App. 3d at 231-32, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62.
55. Former CALJIC (Misdemeanor) No. 16.402.
56. Silva v. Municipal Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 741, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479, 484 (1974).
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that the California Supreme Court agreed to consider Don Barry
Pryor's constitutional challenge to the solicitation portion of sec-
tion 647(a).
Pryor v. Municipal Court
57
The Factual Background
On May 1, 1976, Don Pryor solicited a plainclothed under-
cover police officer to engage in oral copulation. The police officer
had stationed his unmarked car a few feet from where he had ob-
served Pryor "gazing at cars that were passing by containing lone
males. '158 Pryor approached the car and knelt by the driver's open
window. A conversation ensued59 during which Pryor suggested
that they engage in oral sex acts. The police officer alleged that
after this suggestion Pryor recommended that, because he did not
have his own place of residence, they should "go sit and park"80 in
the partially lit parking lot across the street. When the officer re-
marked that he would prefer to go to his home, Pryor agreed and
entered the car. 1 Expecting to be taken to the driver's home,
Pryor was driven to the police officer's waiting partner and ar-
rested, charged with violating section 647(a) for soliciting a "lewd
or dissolute" act in public. 62 Although there are several discrepan-
cies between the testimony of the police officer and Pryor,83 there
57. 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
58. Respondent's Return to Petition for Writ of Prohibition at 8, Pryor v. Municipal
Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
59. There is conflicting testimony regarding which party spoke first. Brief for Peti-
tioner at 6, Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330
(1979).
60. 25 Cal. 3d at 244, 599 P.2d at 639, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
61. Id.
62. Id. Pryor was also charged with possession of less than an ounce of marijuana.
Although his writ of prohibition to the California Supreme Court raised various points re-
garding the marijuana charge, the court issued an alternative writ of prohibition expressly
limiting the proceedings to the § 647(a) charge. Id. at 245, 599 P.2d at 639, 158 Cal. Rptr. at
333.
63. Five such discrepancies were mentioned: (1) who spoke first; (2) whether the term
"cocksucking" was uttered in the car or outside the car; (3) whether the appellant proposed
that he and the officer park in the parking lot; (4) whether the appellant got into the of-
ficer's car and whether the remark was uttered only after the appellant was invited into the
car to go home with the officer; and (5) whether the remark was uttered only after the officer
requested further clarification as to what appellant wanted to do. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7,
Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979). Of these
differences the most significant, and only one discussed in the California Supreme Court
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was no disagreement that Pryor solicited an act of oral sex while in
a public place." At the time of Pryor's arrest, the Consenting
Adults Act decriminalized private acts of oral copulation between
consenting adults. However, whether the solicitation of these
decriminalized acts was still proscribed by section 647(a) remained
undetermined.
At Pryor's trial, the court instructed the jury that oral copula-
tion between males is "lewd or dissolute" as a matter of law. The
court further instructed the jury in a manner whereby they could
find the public solicitation of a private sexual act to be a section
647(a) violation stating that "[i]f the solicitation occurs in a public
place, it is immaterial that the lewd act was intended to occur in a
private place. '6 5 Pryor objected to both instructions and, following
a declaration of mistrial because of a deadlocked jury, filed a peti-
tion for two writs of prohibition with the California Supreme
Court. The court rejected Pryor's first request that the trial court
at retrial be prohibited from giving the same instructions, noting
that the request was based upon anticipated error which is inap-
propriate for a writ of prohibition.68 The court did agree, however,
to consider Pryor's constitutional challenges to section 647(a) on
the grounds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to
trial under a facially unconstitutional statute. 7
The Constitutional Attack On Section 647(a)
Pryor raised five constitutional issues in his attack against sec-
tion 647(a): (1) whether section 647(a) was violative of due process
standards by failing to give adequate notice of what speech is pro-
hibited, encouraging discriminatory enforcement, failing to provide
objective standards to judicial agents, and infringing on the defen-
decision, was Pryor's contention that the only situs discussed for the performance of the sex
act was the officer's home. 25 Cal. 3d at 245, 599 P.2d at 639, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
64. 25 Cal. 3d at 245, 599 P.2d at 639, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
65. Id. The instruction used, CALJIC (Misdemeanor) No. 16.401 (alternative formula-
tion), subsequently was revised in response to the Pryor decision. See notes 124-26 & ac-
companying text infra. In addition to these instructions, the trial judge prohibited Pryor's
attorney from using the word "gay" or "homosexual" in his courtroom. Letter from Thomas
F. Coleman to Larry Levine (Sept. 5, 1980) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). Despite
the instruction, the jury deadlocked, voting seven to five for acquittal. Petitioner's Petition
for a Writ of Prohibition at 3, Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158
Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
66. 25 Cal. 3d at 245, 599 P.2d at 639-40, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
67. Id.
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dant's right to effective representation; (2) whether prior interpre-
tation of section 647(a) evidenced a lack of uniform operation of
the section in violation of article IV, section 16 of the California
Constitution; (3) whether the solicitation portion of section 647(a)
violated the rights of free speech and association; (4) whether the
solicitation portion of section 647(a) was in conflict with the Con-
senting Adults Act; and (5) whether section 647(a) was violative of
the right to equal protection on the grounds that a conviction may
be based on uncorroborated testimony. Although the vagueness,
arbitrary enforcement, and first amendment issues formed the core
of Pryor's arguments, the court's ultimate disposition was founded
primarily upon the vagueness attack.
Void for Vagueness
The court in Pryor was faced with the task of determining
whether the words "lewd and dissolute," as used in section 647(a),
were so unclear in meaning as to render the statute void for vague-
ness. 8 To accomplish this task, the court undertook a three-step
evaluation of section 647(a) to determine if the language of the sec-
tion "is sufficiently specific to meet constitutional vagueness stan-
dards."6 The process encompassed an analysis of the language of
the statute, its legislative history, and California decisions constru-
68. A criminal statute drawn in such vague terms that it gives inadequate or nonexis-
tent notice of what conduct is proscribed violates constitutional due process guarantees. See
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). See also People v. McCaughen, 49 Cal.
2d 409, 317 P.2d 974 (1957). For an analysis of the United States Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the void for vagueness doctrine, see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960). While it is recognized that " '[in most
English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties,' "People v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d
338, 345, 562 P.2d 1315, 1318, 138 Cal. Rptr. 66, 69 (1977) (quoting Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S.
48, 49-50 (1975)), and that "fr]easonable certainty is all that is required," 19 Cal. 3d at 345,
562 P.2d at 1318, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (quoting ACLU v. Board of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 203, 218,
379 P.2d 4, 12, 28 Cal. Rptr. 700, 708 (1963)), a statute written in terms so ambiguous that
persons "of proper intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application" is
unconstitutionally vague. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). This same
standard was used by the California Supreme Court in In re Newbern, 53 Cal. 2d 786, 350
P.2d 116, 3 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1960), which struck down former § 647(11) as unconstitutionally
vague. See notes 16-17 & accompanying text supra.
69. 25 Cal. 3d at 246, 599 P.2d at 640, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 334. The court cited In re
Davis, 242 Cal. App. 2d 645, 51 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966), which held former Penal Code §
650 , prohibiting acts which "openly outrage public decency," unconstitutionally vague, as
the basis for its approach. 25 Cal. 3d at 246, 599 P.2d at 640, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
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ing the statutory language.
The court began with an analysis of the language of the stat-
ute. Noting that the words "lewd and dissolute" are words of com-
mon usage, not legal terms of art,70 the court explained that the
words "do not imply a definite and specific referent, but apply
broadly to conduct which the speaker considers beyond the bounds
of propriety. 7 1 The court therefore deemed the language of section
647(a) to be sufficiently vague as to violate due process.
The court then turned to an examination of the legislative his-
tory of the section to determine whether it was unconstitutionally
vague. Former section 647(5) labeled every lewd or dissolute per-
son a vagrant, a status proscribed by law.72 Requirements of speci-
ficity, it was believed at the time, would undermine the very value
of the law.73 The motivation of the California Legislature in trans-
forming section 647(5) into section 647(a) was simply to alter the
prohibition from one of status to one of conduct. 4 The California
Supreme Court therefore reasoned that the legislative history
"suggests no intent to change the definition of 'lewd or dissolute'
established by the decisions under the former vagrancy statute," of
which section 647(a) was merely a "lineal descendant."7 5 No spe-
cific and clear meaning of lewd or dissolute could be discerned
from a statute purposely designed to be broad and unclear.
With no guidance found in the legislative history, the court
proFeeded to analyze prior judicial interpretations of section 647(a)
in search of the constitutionally mandated specificity. Instead of
70. But cf. People v. Williams, 59 Cal. 397, 398 (1881) (California Supreme Court stat-
ing, with reference to the sodomy statute, that "[e]very person of ordinary intelligence un-
derstands what the crime against nature with a human being is".) While there is considera-
ble doubt as to the validity of the Williams court's observation, see SExUAL FREEDOM, supra
note 41, at 23-27, the expression "crime against nature" was considered a legal term of art
implying sodomy. Id.
71. 25 Cal. 3d at 246-47, 599 P.2d at 640, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
72. See notes 9-10 & accompanying text supra.
73. In the first reported case concerning former § 647(5), the court responded to a
constitutional attack on the section's specificity by stating: "To say that the Legislature
must specify the many evil and corrupt practices which might constitute one a lewd or dis-
solute person would often render the enforcement of a police regulation in connection there-
with impossible, and this without considering the indelicacy and impropriety of expression
which would often be necessary." In re McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765, 766-67, 96 P. 110, 111
(1908). The court feared that specific language in the vagrancy law would both impinge
upon police discretion and force the legislators to enumerate the many acts deemed
unlawful.
74. See note 22 & accompanying text supra.
75. 25 Cal. 3d at 248, 599 P.2d at 641, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
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finding a clear and definite construction, however, the court lik-
ened the cases construing section 647(a) and its predecessor to
"opening a thesaurus. 7'  No specific proscribed acts could be
found; rather, the opinions offered a lengthy list of pejorative ad-
jectives as definitions of lewd and dissolute. These adjectives stood
as substitutes for the terms lewd and dissolute but failed to clarify
them because "vague statutory language is not rendered more pre-
cise by defining it in terms of synonyms of equal or greater uncer-
tainty. 7 7 The court noted that if these "epithetical adjectives"
could be deemed to apply to the terms lewd and dissolute as used
in section 647(a), then any public or private conduct could be pro-
scribed by the section as construed by past decisions.7
8
Section 647(a) failed to withstand each step of the court's tri-
partite examination, and the terms lewd and dissolute were thus
determined to be so unclear that section 647(a) failed to meet con-
stitutional requirements of specificity.
Restructuring Penal Code Section 647(a)
Upon concluding that section 647(a) was unconstitutionally
vague the court did not end its analysis. The court noted that:
"The judiciary bears an obligation to construe enactments to give
specific content to terms that might otherwise be unconstitution-
ally vague.., even if that course requires us to depart from prior
precedent." 19 Thus, the court embarked upon a process of constru-
ing the statute, gleaning a constitutionally specific construction
"from analysis of the role of section 647, subdivision (a), in the
structure of the California penal law."80
76. Id. at 248, 599 P.2d at 641, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
77. Id. at 248-49, 599 P.2d at 641-42, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36. The court listed the
following adjectives as judicial attempts to define the terms lewd and dissolute: lustful,
lascivious, unchaste, wanton, loose in morals and conduct; behavior which is loose from re-
straint, unashamed, lawless, recklessly abandoned to sensual pleasures, profligate, wanton,
debauched; conduct found disgusting, repulsive, filthy, foul, abominable, loathsome. Id.
78. Id. at 250-51, 599 P.2d at 643, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
79. Id. at 253-54, 599 P.2d at 645, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
80. Id. The City Attorney of Los Angeles argued strenuously that the court should
construe the statute so as to "reasonably uphold, intact the entire scheme of the statute."
Respondents Return to Petition for Writ of Prohibition at 17, Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25
Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979). Pryor's attorney, on the other hand,
argued with equal vigor that the court should avoid engaging in "judicial legislating" and
should, thus, simply strike down the statute and leave its reconstruction to the legislature.
Petitioner's Trial Brief at 34, Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158
Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
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The terms lewd and dissolute, the court determined, are sy-
nonymous81 and refer only to sexually motivated conduct.82 The
terms encompass only conduct which is "likely to offend": conduct
involving "the touching of the genitals, buttocks, or female breast,
for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, annoyance or of-
fense."83 So defined, section 647(a) proscribes these acts performed
or solicited in public, and is not concerned with acts performed to
arouse the prurient interest of an audience 4 or acts involving inde-
cent exposure where the actor's purpose is to attract public atten-
tion. 5 The court noted that section 647(a) "serves the primary
purpose of protecting onlookers who might be offended by the pro-
scribed conduct."8 To enable section 647(a) to meet constitutional
81. 25 Cal. 3d at 255, 599 P.2d at 646, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340. The view that lewd and
dissolute were synonymous was also a part of the CALJIC instruction often used in § 647
cases. The instruction, CALJIC (Misdemeanor) No. 16.402, stated that "the words lewd or
dissolute are synonymous and mean lustful, lascivious, unchaste, wanton, or loose in morals
and conduct." See notes 54-55 & accompanying text supra.
82. 25 Cal. 3d at 255, 599 P.2d at 646, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340. The court based this
determination on the requirement of Penal Code § 290 that all § 647(a) violators register as
sex offenders and reasoned that the legislature could not have intended that a person com-
mitting a nonsexual act in violation of § 647(a) would be required to comply with that stat-
ute. See Barrows v. Municipal Court, 1 Cal. 3d 821, 464 P.2d 483, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970).
Cf. In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362, 497 P.2d 807, 102 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1972) (requiring that an
indecent exposure proscribed by Penal Code § 314, which also requires a § 290 registration,
be sexually motivated). But see 22 ASSEMBLY INF RiM COMm. REP. No. 1, at 9 (1959-1961)
(supporting the decision in People v. Jaurequia, 142 Cal. App. 2d 555, 298 P.2d 896 (1956),
wherein a narcotics addict was held to be a dissolute person under § 647(a)).
83. 25 Cal. 3d at 256, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341. The court viewed the
requirement of specific intent as an added assurance that their revised construction of §
647(a) would pass constitutional muster. Id. at 256, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340-
41. But see Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972) (adding a specific
intent requirement will not render an otherwise unconstitutionally vague vagrancy statute
constitutional).
84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.6 (West Supp. 1980), which prohibits such acts, provides:
"Every person who knowingly engages or participates in, manages, produces, sponsors,
presents or exhibits obscene live conduct to or before an assembly or audience consisting of
at least one person or spectator in any public place or in any place exposed to public view,
or in any place open to the public or to a segment thereof, whether or not an admission fee
is charged, or whether or not attendance is conditioned upon the presentation of a member-
ship card or other token, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
85. This'conduct is prohibited by CAL. PENAL CODE § 314 (West Supp. 1980), which
provides, in pertinent part, that every person who "[e]xposes his person, or the private parts
thereof, in any public place, or in any place where there are present other persons to be
offended or annoyed thereby... is guilty of a misdemeanor." The case of In re Smith, 7
Cal. 3d 362, 497 P.2d 807, 102 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1972), added the requirement of specific
intent to the indecent exposure proscription, thus exempting such acts as nude sunbathing
and urinating in public from being violative of § 314.
86. 25 Cal. 3d at 255, 599 P.2d at 646, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
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standards of specificity, the following construction of the section
was provided:
The terms "lewd" and "dissolute" in this section are synonymous,
and refer to conduct which involves the touching of the genitals,
buttocks, or female breast for the purpose of sexual arousal, grati-
fication, annoyance or offense, if the actor knows or should know
of the presence of persons who may be offended by this conduct.
The statute prohibits such conduct only if it occurs in any public
place or any place open to the public or exposed to public view; it
further prohibits the solicitation of such conduct to be performed
in any public place or in any place open to the public or exposed
to public view.
87
The rationale underlying this construction of section 647(a) re-
mains unknown. The court explains neither its basis for 'selecting
which acts are lewd nor the origin of the requirement that there be
the "presence of persons who may be offended."
The court recognized that the underlying purpose of the sec-
tion is to protect the unwilling from being forced to view offensive
conduct,8  reasoning that the "gist of [a section 647(a) offense]...
is the presence or possibility of the presence of someone to be of-
fended by the conduct." 89 The Pryor court further stated that
"even if conduct occurs in a location that is technically a public
place, a place open to the public, or one exposed to public view,
the state has little interest in prohibiting that conduct if there
are no persons present who may be offended."90
If the purpose of section 647(a) is to protect the public from
annoyance, then a requisite for a violation of the section must be
that the actor's conduct or solicitation of conduct is able to be per-
ceived by an offendable person.9 1 The Pryor court recognized this
fact by apparently construing a section 647(a) offense to require
the actual presence of a potentially offendable person.
92
The limitation placed on the state's involvement by the Cali-
87. Id. at 256-57, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
88. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
89. 25 Cal. 3d at 256, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (quoting In re Steinke, 2
Cal. App. 3d 569, 576, 82 Cal. Rptr. 489, 495 (1969)). The Pryor court disapproved of
Steinke, which involved sexual acts in a closed room in a massage parlor, because of its
broad interpretation of places "open to the public" under § 647(a). 25 Cal. 3d at 256 n.12,
599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
90. 25 Cal. 3d at 256, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (emphasis added).
91. See Project, supra note 3, at 698.
92. See notes 111-30 & accompanying text infra.
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fornia Supreme Court in Pryor appears to be based in California's
strong public policy favoring privacy rights.9 3 In the absence of a
potentially offendable onlooker, the "sexual autonomy" 9' rights
guarded by the privilege of privacy are protected. Because Pryor's
arrest was for public solicitation of a private sexual act, the court
was expected to confront the issue of whether the solicitation por-
93. Article I, § 1 of the California Constitution (1879, amended 1974) provides: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." The California right to privacy in-
cludes "an enormously broad and diverse field of personal action and belief." White v. Da-
vis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 773-74, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 (1975). The California
Supreme Court recently interpreted the state's privacy right broadly, invalidating a Santa
Barbara housing ordinance restricting the number of unrelated persons who could share a
single family dwelling. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436,
164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980). See also Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 210 (1979) (sexual relations protected by the constitution's right to privacy provision).
The United States Constitution also includes a privacy guarantee, although its basis has
been the source of disagreement. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The
United States Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to expand this right into the
realm of public morality. In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976), the Court summarily upheld the
lower court's refusal to invalidate Virginia's broad sodomy statute, a statute which on its
face applies to heterosexuals as well as homosexuals and to married persons as well as un-
married persons. Such a decision confuses law with morality. Judge Merhige pointed out in
his forceful dissent that "the issue centers not around morality and decency, but the consti-
tutional right of privacy." 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting). Many commenta-
tors feel Doe is irreconcilable with Griswold and its progeny. See, e.g., Richards, Sexual
Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and
the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTNos L.J. 957 (1979). The action of the Court elicited
harsh criticism. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 944-47 (1979); Comment, Doe v. Com-
monwealth Attorney: A Set-Back for the Right of Privacy, 65 Ky. L.J. 748 (1977).
One court has held a broadly interpreted sodomy statute violative of the constitutional
right to privacy. In People v. Onofre, 72 A.D. 2d 268, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980) affd, -
N.Y.2d -, (filed Dec. 18, 1980), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, unani-
mously invalidated the New York sodomy statute on such grounds, pronouncing. "Personal
sexual conduct is a fundamental right, protected by the right to privacy because of the
transcendental importance of sex to the human condition, the intimacy of the conduct, and
its relationship to a person's right to control his or her own body.... The right is broad
enough to include sexual acts between non-married persons ... and intimate consensual
homosexual conduct." Id. at 272, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (citations omitted).
94. See Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979). Pro-
fessor Richards argues that the constitutional right of privacy is an "autonomy right" that is
"premised on principles of obligation and duty that secure equal concern and respect for
autonomy. The right of privacy does not merely signify that it is no longer not morally
wrong to do certain things, but that there is an affirmative moral right to do them which it
is, by definition, a transgression of moral duty to violate." Id. at 1000-01.
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tion of section 647(a) violated the first amendment in light of the
passage of the Consenting Adults Act.e5 All of the cases decided
before Pryor concerned the solicitation of an unlawful act, long
recognized as speech unprotected by the first amendment."6 The
enactment of the Consenting Adults Act, however, created a more
anomalous situation: the Act requires that the sexual act engaged
in be consensual to be lawful, whereas section 647(a), as inter-
preted, seemed to prohibit a party from seeking the needed
consent.
97
The Pryor court rejected earlier views that public solicitation
of private noncriminal conduct was prohibited by section 647(a),9 8
and noted that the cases so holding were "inconsistent with the
protection of private conduct afforded by [the Consenting Adults
Act]."' 9 The court therefore limited the scope of the solicitation
portion of section 647(a) to prohibiting "solicitations which pro-
pose the commission of conduct itself banned by section 647, sub-
division (a), that is, lewd or dissolute conduct which occurs in a
public place." 100 Thus, the court severely restricted the scope of
the solicitation portion of section 647(a) by confining its applica-
95. For a discussion of the Act, see notes 43-47 & accompanying text supra. A major
portion of the briefs submitted by the parties in Pryor concerned whether noncommercial
sexual solicitation could be constitutionally proscribed. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae on
Behalf of Petitioner by the National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties, Pryor v. Munici-
pal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979), reprinted in 4 SEXUAL L.
REP. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Amicus].
The first amendment challenge was based on allegations that the statute's language was
vague and overbroad. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARv. L. Rav. 844 (1970). The void for vagueness doctrine is often used by the United
States Supreme Court to provide increased first amendment protection. Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 75 (1960). See Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521
(1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
96. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); Goldin v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 23 Cal. 3d 638, 654-57, 592 P.2d 289, 299-301,
153 Cal. Rptr. 802, 812-14 (1979).
97. By providing the right to private consensual sexual conduct, but denying the
means to its implementation, decriminalization of the conduct would be largely illusory.
Amicus, supra note 95, at 14.
98. 25 Cal. 3d at 254, 599 P.2d at 645, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (disapproving People v.
Dudley, 250 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 955, 58 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1967), and People v. Mesa, 265 Cal.
App. 2d 746, 71 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1968)). The Pryor court specifically rejected the basis for
these decisions noting that § 647(a) "does not prohibit offensive public solicitations propos-
ing private lawful acts." 25 Cal. 3d at 254 & n.11, 599 P.2d at 645-46, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340-
41.
99. 25 Cal. 3d at 254, 599 P.2d at 645, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
100. Id. at 254, 599 P.2d at 645-46, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 339 (emphasis in original).
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tion to a narrow list of proscribed sexually motivated conduct.10 1
Earlier cases, however, attempted to justify the broad solicita-
tion proscription in other ways. Noting that obscenity falls outside
the protection of the first amendment,"" the court of appeal in
Silva defined lewd as "obscene" and rationalized that a solicitation
for an obscene act must itself be obscene.103
Another theory presented to justify the section 647(a) solicita-
tion proscription is that a solicitation constitutes "fighting
words,"10' which also are left unprotected by the first amendment.
The California Court of Appeal, in People v. Dudley,10 5 attempted
to bring its decision into the fighting words exception noting that
"to some . . . a homosexual proposition is inflammatory, which
public utterance might well lead to a breach of the peace."106 Re-
pudiating the fighting words doctrine, one court explained: "In the
same way in which invitations to engage in sexual activity are not,
necessarily, obscene, those invitations are not, necessarily, fighting
101. The basis for determining the proscribed acts is unclear. The specific acts enu-
merated, see note 87 & accompanying text supra, probably are taken from the obscenity
statutes. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), the Supreme Court required that
definitions of sexual conduct deemed obscene be specifically defined in the state law.
102. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
103. Silva v. Municipal Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1974). For a
discussion of Silva, see notes 32-39 & accompanying text supra. Under this standard, any
communication for an act engendering disgust, revulsion, or anger in a significant portion of
a given community would be without first amendment protection. This results from the
application of the "community standard" test of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26
(1973), which uses a community standard to determine what is obscene.
104. Under this theory, speech loses its first amendment protection if it contains ex-
pressions "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
- of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (footnote omitted).
Justice Powell, in determining whether words constituted fighting words, would consider the
nature of the person to whom the words were directed. Words that would constitute fighting
words if spoken to an average citizen would not be so labeled when directed to a person
expected to "exercise a higher degree of restraint," for example, a police officer. Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). See also MODEL
PENAL CODa § 250.1, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
105. 250 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 955, 58 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1967).
106. Id. at 959, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 559. The communication must be more than annoying.
The first amendment has never been viewed so narrowly as to exclude a communication
from its protection simply because it is "bothersome." In fact, the Supreme Court has enun-
ciated a contrary view: "[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to
invite dispute.... Speech is often provocative or challenging. It may strike at prejudice
and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an
idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against
censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (citations omitted).
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words. In fact those invitations could easily be classified as loving
words."
1 07
The California Supreme Court rejected both the obscenity and
fighting words theories, stating: "It is possible-in fact, common-
place-to solicit sexual activity in language which itself is not ob-
scene. Similarly, in the right context and to an apparently recep-
tive listener, a solicitation is unlikely to provoke a breach of the
peace." 108 The court did not comment directly on whether a non-
obscene solicitation for a legal act could constitutionally be pun-
ished. Observing that offensive public solicitations were proscribed
by Penal Code section 415(3) as acts disturbing the peace, 09 the
court remarked that it was questionable whether the state could
constitutionally punish nonobscene solicitations for lawful acts
which are not inherently likely to provoke a breach of the peace." 0
By limiting the scope of section 647(a) to solicitation for criminal
acts, the court avoided a direct confrontation with the issue of
whether the state can proscribe the solicitation of lawful conduct
consistent with the first amendment.
107. City of Columbus v. Scott, 47 Ohio App. 2d 287, 291, 353 N.E.2d 858, 861 (1975).
The validity of the Scott holding, which struck down a Columbus ordinance prohibiting
solicitation of "sexual activity with the offender, when the offender knows such solicitation
is offensive to the other person, or is reckless in that regard," COLUMUS OHIO CoDE §
2307.04(B), is now questionable. Recently the Ohio Supreme Court rendered an opinion
deeming homosexual solicitations to constitute fightings words, thus precluding first amend-
ment protection. State v. Phipps, 58 Ohio St. 2d 271, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (1979). The Phipps
court explained that only in a "more barbarous age when human dignity had not reached
the level expected by citizens in our modem society" would a homosexual solicitation not
have been deemed fightings words. Id. at 277, 389 N.E.2d at 1133. The reasoning of the
court in Phipps is highly suspect. Society should not condone the violence-manifested big-
otry of some of its members. Homosexual propositions are rarely made to an unwilling re-
cipient, see notes 117-19 & accompanying text infra, thus mitigating their potential as fight-
ing words, and a person solicited need simply say "no" or walk away. Cf. Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1974) (overturning conviction of defendant, arrested wearing jacket
in courthouse bearing words "Fuck the Draft"; such words held not to constitute fighting
words). See also Amicus, supra note 95, at 18.
108. 25 Cal. 3d at 252 n.7, 599 P.2d at 644, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 338 (citations omitted).
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 415(3) (West Supp. 1980) provides: "Any person who uses
offensive words in a public place which are inherently likely to provoke an immediate vio-
lent reaction [is guilty of disturbing the peace, a misdemeanor]."
110. 25 Cal. 3d at 254 n.11, 599 P.2d at 646, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340 (citation omitted).
See also People v. Gibson, 184 Colo. 444, 521 P.2d 774 (1974) (Colorado Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional a statute prohibiting loitering for purposes of soliciting de-
viate sexual intercourse, noting that it violated due process requirements by not requiring
the loitering to be coupled with any other overt conduct).
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Resultant Ambiguities and Suggested Clarification
The Pryor court's restrictive definition of lewd and dissolute
as used in section 647(a) appears to limit the involvement of the
state in regulating sexual conduct. Several ambiguities exist, how-
ever, which may weaken the effect of the court's decision. Whether
a potentially offendable person must actually be present for an act
to be "lewd or dissolute" under section 647(a) remains somewhat
unclear, although the court's reasoning would be furthered by such
a requirement. Additionally, it is uncertain whether the necessary
"offended person" must be a third party witnessing the unlawful
solicitation or whether the solicited police officer fulfills the
requirement.
Actual versus Likely Presence
Under the Pryor court's construction of section 647(a), lewd
conduct is proscribed only if "the actor knows or should know of
the presence of persons who may be offended by his conduct." '111
The court failed to indicate definitively whether it is sufficient that
the proscribed public conduct occur in a place where it is likely
that offendable persons will perceive it, or whether such persons
must actually be present when the offense occurs.112
The determination of this issue will profoundly affect the so-
licitation portion of section 647(a), especially if the actual presence
of an offendable person is deemed to be mandated by Pryor. Under
the actual presence interpretation, proof of a section 647(a) offense
would require a showing that a potentially offendable person actu-
ally would be present at the time the act was to be consummated.
Only in those situations in which a person is solicited to engage in
a lewd act "then and there" would the elements of section 647(a)
be satisfied.11 3 Such an interpretation would lessen the likelihood
of an abuse of the solicitation law.
111. 25 Cal. 3d at 256, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
112. The Los Angeles City Attorney interpreted the holding to require the actual
presence of a potentially offendable person and moved to have the court declare the broader
"likely others will perceive it" standard be enforced. Respondent's Petition for Modification
of Opinion at 2, Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330
(1979). In October, 1979, the petition was denied.
113. The decoy officer or victim could testify as to the circumstances in which the
solicitation was made, including the place, time, and persons present.
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Because solicitation is the most inchoate of crimes, statutes
proscribing solicitation merit close judicial scrutiny.11 4 The scru-
tiny must be even greater where a sex offense is involved, because
"[n]o crime is easier to charge or harder to disprove than the sex
offense. 1 15 The importance of this scrutiny becomes strikingly ap-
parent in the context of section 647(a) because the great majority
of section 647(a) solicitation convictions are based solely on the ar-
resting officer's allegation that he or she was verbally solicited by
the defendant to engage in lewd conduct.""' The strong concern for
the innocent bystander suffering the affront and indignation of
"the public blandishment of deviates," does not often justify pro-
scription of homosexual solicitation because such solicitations are
usually quite subtle.11 7 Solicitation to engage in homosexual con-
duct most often is accomplished in a circumspect manner, the re-
suit of some encouragement on the part of the person solicited.118
Without the use of plainclothed agents there would be very few
solicitation arrests; complaints are rarely received by the police,119
a fact that attests to the discreet nature of the solicitations.
12 0
114. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, Cmu1NAL LAW § 58, at 416-20 (1972).
The legislature may proscribe the solicitation of any criminal act. See Silva v. Munici-
pal Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 733, 115 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Pryor
v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979). California penal
statutes often include a solicitation proscription where the act solicited, if consummated,
would be a felony. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 653f (West Supp. 1980) (felony to solicit for
bribery, robbery, burglary, grand theft, receiving stolen property, extortion, rape, perjury,
forgery, kidnapping, arson, assault with a deadly weapon, murder). Several misdemeanor
statutes also have a solicitation prohibition. See, e.g., Id. § 303a (West 1970) (misdemeanor
to solicit purchase of alcoholic beverages); id. § 646 (misdemeanor to solicit a personal in-
jury claim with the intent to sue out of state).
115. Project, supra note 3, at 695. In People v. Putnam, 20 Cal. 2d 885, 888, 129 P.2d
367, 369 (1942), the court recognized this danger and adopted the procedure of allowing a
defendant a cautionary instruction to the jury admonishing them to view sex offense accusa-
tions with added scrutiny. Id. at 889, 129 P.2d at 370. See also Kelly v. United States, 194
F.2d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Note, Decoy Enforcement of Homosexual Laws, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 259, 280 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Decoy Enforcement].
116. The U.C.L.A. Project noted that of the 434 § 647(a) prosecutions it studied, 425
were based exclusively upon the arresting officer's testimony. Project, supra note 3, at 695
n.57.
117. Id. at 698-99 & n.84. See D. MAcNAsRA & E. SAGARN, SEx, CrME, AND THE LAW
136 (1977); Amicus, supra note 95, at 10.
118. As Dr. Curran explained in a "reservation" to the Wolfenden Report: "Males sel-
dom importune other males who do not give them encouragement." CoMMIrE ON HoMo-
SEXUAL OFFENSES AND PRosTrTUTION, THa WOLFENDEN REPORT 207 (1963).
119. Project, supra note 3, at 698-99 & n.83.
120. See notes 117-19 & accompanying text supra; notes 133-35 & accompanying text
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The purpose of the solicitation portion of the section, to deter
the public consummation of the solicited lewd act, is furthered by
the requirement of actual presence. The court's interest in protect-
ing the potentially offendable person is adequately protected by
the requirement that no crime can be committed in the absence of
such a potentially offendable person.
The California Supreme Court's decision in In re Anders,121
the first case decided upon the holding of Pryor, provides further
support for the interpretation that an act is not lewd or dissolute
under section 647(a) unless a potentially offendable person is actu-
ally present. Anders brought a writ of habeas corpus before the
court to challenge an alleged violation of section 647(a). In holding
that Anders might be entitled to retroactive relief under the Pryor
decision, 22 the court stated that the test to be applied in deter-
mining whether a section 647(a) violation existed is whether the
petitioner "knew or should have known of the presence of persons
who may be offended by his act. 1 23 At the time Anders was de-
cided, the court had received and had considered the Los Angeles
City Attorney's proposed revision of the court's language in
Pryor-changing "presence" to "likely presence"-and chose to
use the existing definition without change.
The CALJIC Committee also struggled with the issue of
whether Pryor required actual or likely presence of a potentially
offendable person and drafted a jury instructioh which is as ambig-
uous as the language of section 647(a) creating the confusion. The
1980 revision of CALJIC No. 16.400 (Lewd Conduct) provides:
Every person is guilty of violating Penal Code § 647 (a), a misde-
meanor, who: (1) With the specific intent to sexually arouse, grat-
ify, annoy or offend, (2) [Solicits anyone to engage] [engages] in
121. 25 Cal. 3d 414, 599 P.2d 1364, 158 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1979). Anders was convicted
solely on the testimony of a police officer who allegedly observed, through the 18 inch mesh
grating covering a portion of the door, the petitioner masturbating in a private enclosed pay
toilet.
122. The Pryor court, in explaining the retroactivity of the decision, stated that "[a]
defendant whose conviction is now final .. . will be entitled to relief by writ of habeas
corpus only if there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction and if it
appears that the statute as construed in this opinion did not prohibit his conduct." 25 CaL
3d at 258, 599 P.2d at 648, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 342. Justice Clark, in his brief dissent, argued
that granting retroactive effect to the majority opinion created "a remedy for which there
was no wrong." Id. at 259, 599 P.2d at 349, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
123. 25 Cal. 3d at 417, 599 P.2d at 1365, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
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conduct which involves the touching of the genitals, buttocks or
female breast in any public place, or a place open to the public or
exposed to public view, and (3) Knows or should know that there
is present a person who may be offended by such conduct.12
Following the Pryor decision, in 1979 the committee had adopted
an instruction which included "or will be" after the word "is" in
subsection three of the instruction. The requirement that the actor
knows or should know that a potentially offendable person will be
present was subject to conflicting interpretation; it was unclear
whether the mere foreseeability of a possibly offendable person's
presence was sufficient for conviction, or whether the instruction
contemplated actual presence of such a person in the future. Al-
though the troublesome language was removed in the 1980 revi-
sion, the Committee noted that "it may be proper and within the
meaning of Pryor v. Municipal Court" to use the 1979 version "in
certain situations where the prosecution is based on soliciting. ' 125
The instances in which this would be appropriate are not elabo-
rated. The instruction thus aids little in resolving the ambiguity, a
result, no doubt, of the Committee's inability to agree on whether
Pryor requires actual presence or merely likely presence.126
Nonetheless, the interpretation that Pryor requires only the
"likely presence" of a potentially offendable person reinstitutes
vagueness into the statute because there is no clear basis for deter-
mining whether a place is one in which potentially offendable per-
sons are likely to be found. Further, the addition of a specific in-
tent requirement to section 647(a)1 27 makes public solicitation for a
future sexual act vulnerable to intervening variables which may al-
ter the present specific intent requirement.
128
124. CALIC (Misdemeanor) No. 16.400 (Supp. 1980).
125. Id. (Use Note).
126. Id.
127. The Pryor court's definitional limitation of the term lewd to enumerated acts
done for "purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or affront" was intended not only to set
parameters for § 647(a) violations, but also to add a requirement of specific intent. See 25
Cal. 3d at 256, 599 P.2d at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 340-41 (citing In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362,
366, 497 P.2d 807, 810, 102 Cal. Rptr. 335, 338 (1972)).
128. If A solicits B to engage in a lewd act on a specified beach where they are to meet
in one hour, there is no proximity to the completed proscribed conduct. Upon arrival at the
designated place, A may abort the proposed sexual activity because of the presence of others
who might be offended. As explained in Project, supra note 3, at 697: "If the purpose of
section 647(a) is to prevent more serious lewd acts, an oral solicitation might not be suffi-
cient grounds for conviction because it does not necessarily indicate a firm intent to commit
the act solicited" (footnote omitted).
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The "likely presence" standard also would create first amend-
ment problems in the application of the solicitation portion of sec-
tion 647(a), problems which the Pryor court carefully avoided. It is
well recognized that a statute prohibiting the solicitation of crimi-
nal acts is not protected by the first amendment. 12 9 Yet this pro-
scription extends only to "inciting or producing imminent lawless
action [which] is likely to incite or produce such action." ' Solici-
tation of a lewd act to be performed at some future time does not
fall within these parameters, and thus is speech protected by the
first amendment.
The Offended Person
The purpose of section 647(a) is to protect offendable persons
from viewing public displays of lewdness. As indicated above, there
exists no section 647(a) offense absent the presence of a potentially
offendable person. A critical question thus arises: May the under-
cover police officer function as both the offended person and as the
arresting officer?
Allowing the undercover officer to qualify as the offended
party will heighten the corroboration problems inherent in a solic-
itaion offense when the accused and the officer are the only two
persons present in a given place. Such a setting makes it easier for
police overzealousness to result in a misinterpretation of the situa-
tion. In Guarro v. United States,131 a case involving an alleged sex-
ual assault upon a decoy officer, the court mentioned the possibil-
ity of the occurrence of indirect solicitations from a police officer
who "not only is aware of what is happening, but, furthermore...
may think that it is part of his job to see to it that such things as
are alleged here do happen to him. ' 132 The court distinguished un-
provoked solicitations, for which an officer could be the "victim,"
from induced solicitations, for which he or she could not. However,
this distinction offers little assistance because nearly all solicita-
tions are in response to some suggestive conduct on the part of the
solicited individual.' s Homosexual solicitations are particularly
129. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
130. Id. at 447 (footnote omitted).
131. 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
132. Id. at 581.
133. Project, supra note 3, at 698 n.82; Amicus, supra note 95, at 10. In Pryor, the
defendant alleged that he did not mention a sex act until the waiting plainclothed officer
had asked defendant what he wanted to do. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Pryor v. Municipal
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discreet; in a country where many continue to view homosexuality
with repugnance, many homosexuals logically will avoid soliciting a
clearly unwilling recipient. Further, the homosexual often employs
subtleties unintelligible to the unwary."' It is the clandestine na-
ture of these solicitations that requires such active undercover po-
lice involvement, for without decoys few section 647(a) arrests
would be made.135
The crucial issue in determining whether an arresting officer
can be the offendable person is whether the police officer can be
his or her own victim."' 6 An undercover officer's purpose is the ap-
prehension of solicitors; thus he or she participates in both verbal
and nonverbal communication with the arrested party. This places
importance upon the subjective feelings of each arresting officer
which, therefore, should require an investigation of their standards
in order to discover those officers with an inherent bias.187
Another fundamental consideration in the determination of
who constitutes an offendable person is the significance of the sub-
jective state of mind of each party involved in the solicitation. It is
likely that after preliminary gesturing, eye contact, and possibly
conversation, the accused would be able to deny knowledge (either
actual or constructive) that the other person might be offended by
the proposition. In view of this, it is unclear whether the solicited
party must be actually offended or whether the reasonableness of
Court, 25 Cal. 3d 238, 599 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979).
134. See D. MAcNAmARA & E. SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1977); Amicus,
supra note 95, at 10.
135. "In fact, complaints to the police regarding lewd solicitations are infrequent...
[T]he fact that few complaints are received may lead to the conclusion that the cost of
'operating' suspected homosexuals with decoys is not justified in light of the minimal social
harm created by the occasional, indiscriminately made indecent solicitation." Project, supra
note 3, at 699.
The Copilow and Coleman update of the U.C.L.A. Project showed that nearly all §
647(a) arrests were effectuated by decoys. Of the 662 § 647(a) arrests in the report, 642 were
made by plainclothed officers, 15 by uniformed police officers, and only 5 involved com-
plaints of private citizens (2 actually coming from private security guards). Copilow & Cole-
man, Report on the Enforcement of Section 647(a) of the California Penal Code by the Los
Angeles Police Department (1972) (unpublished report) (on file with the Hastings Law
Journal).
136. See Project, supra note 3, at 698. But see Decoy Enforcement, supra note 111, at
270 (the "dangerousness of the defendant" should be the critical concern).
137. Hypothetically, the undercover officer would have to testify in each case, explain-
ing that while he or she has worked for several years in the vice squad, spends several hours
each week seeking violators in various public restrooms, and has made dozens of § 647(a)
arrests, he or she still finds the acts proposed to be personally offensive.
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the defendant's subjective belief is the central concern.13 8 Under
the latter interpretation, the subjective, secretly held feelings of
the solicited party are not relevant; a person, including an under-
cover officer, who places himself or herself in such a situation and
who acts objectively to encourage lewd conduct, would not be able
to testify later as to whether he or she was covertly offended. In-
stead, objective factors such as conduct, and the time and place of
the solicitation must be considered in determining the unreasona-
bleness of the actor's knowledge of the presence of potentially of-
fendable persons. 139
138. Because intent is definitionally subjective and Pryor requires specific intent in its
definition of lewd, it is quite tenable that the defendant's subjective belief should control.
This issue was litigated recently in a complex proceeding which merits discussion, although
the trial court's opinion was ordered decertified by the California Supreme Court.
The confusing chain of events began with the reversal of the municipal court's convic-
tion of the defendant by the Appellate Department of the Superior Court for the County of
Los Angeles. The defendant was arrested for soliciting an undercover policeman in an area
reputed for "pickups." The defendant had followed the officer into a deserted women's rest-
room. The case was reversed on the grounds that there was no showing of a present offend-
able person because the police officer did not testify that he was offended and no other
person was present.
After the opinion became final, the superior court appellate division received a letter
from the Office of the City Attorney of Los Angeles, a nonparty to the action. The letter
stated that the court's opinion misconstrued the Pryor decision, arguing that the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's subjective belief as to the presence of offendable persons, and not
whether the solicited person was actually offended, was the determining factor. The superior
court agreed and authorized the Court of Appeal of the Second Appellate District to correct
the superior court's misinterpretation, the defendant arguing that a reasonable person
would not expect a male loitering in an unlit women's restroom in a known "pickup" spot at
1:15 a.m. to be offended by a brief sexual touching. The court of appeal refused to alter the
superior court's decision, and in May, 1980, the California Supreme Court ordered the supe-
rior court appellate division opinion unpublished.
139. Section 647(a) only concerns conduct which is performed or solicited to be per-
formed in "any public place, or in any place open to the public or exposed to public view."
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West 1970). Thus, an analysis of the situs of the act must be
undertaken to determine whether § 647(a) applies; if the place is deemed private there can
be no § 647(a) violation.
In Pryor, the court did not define "public place" although they disapproved of an opin-
ion which held that a closed room made available to different members of the public at
successive time intervals was a place "open to the public." 25 Cal. 3d at 256 n.12, 599 P.2d
at 647, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (disapproving In re Steinke, 2 Cal. App. 3d 569, 82 Cal. Rptr.
789 (1969)). The court did, however, require the presence of an offendable person before an
act is lewd under § 647(a), and the two notions often overlap. If the proper test for a §
647(a) offense is the defendant's reasonable belief of the offendability of persons present,
the situs may reasonably be considered private. California has labeled public toilets a place
of reasonable privacy expectations, and held searches thereof, without probable cause to
suspect a defendant of criminal conduct, to be illegal. See People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884,
506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d
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Although the Pryor court explained that "[t]he purpose un-
derlying our adoption of a new construction of Penal Code section
647, subdivision (a), is not to deter improper police action,"' 140 the
court recognized that the vaguely worded section "creates the dan-
ger that police, prosecutors, judges and juries will lack sufficient
standards to reach their decisions, thus opening the door to arbi-
trary or discriminatory enforcement of the law."1 4 The court ac-
817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962); Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21
Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962). In Triggs, the court held that "the standard for determining what is
an illegal search is whether defendant's 'reasonable expectaion of privacy was violated by
unreasonable governmental intrusion."' 8 Cal. 3d at 81, 506 P.2d at 244, 106 Cal. Rptr. at
413 (quoting People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1104, 458 P.2d 713, 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633,
638 (1969)).
In Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973),
however, the California Supreme Court upheld revocation of the petitioner's teaching cre-
dential for her participation in a "swinger's party" held at a private home and infiltrated by
an undercover police officer who feigned an interest in "swinging." In a vigorous dissent
from the majority opinion which labeled the private home a semipublic place, Justice Tobri-
ner argued that the petitioner's acts occurred in a private place as the "only persons wit-
nessing the conduct were members of. . .a private club limited to persons who expressly
attested their desire to view or engage in diverse sexual activity." Id. at 41, 513 P.2d at 897,
109 Cal. Rptr. at 673 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
Despite the similarity of the analysis, the "public-private place" and "present offend-
able person" considerations must be separated. The initial determination must decide
whether the situs of the act (or proposed act) is a public or private place. Only if it is
deemed public will the court embark upon an analysis under the Pryor holding.
140. 25 Cal. 3d at 258, 599 P.2d at 648, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
141. Id. at 252, 599 P.2d at 644, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The desire to limit discretion in
both law enforcement officials and the courts by ensuring the existence of definite rules may
be the underlying objective of the void for vagueness doctrine. See Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 81 (1960) ("the void-for-
vagueness doctrine may be regarded less as a principle regulating the permissible relation-
ship between vritten law and the potential offender than as a practical instrument mediat-
ing between, on the one hand, all the organs of public coercion of a state and, on the other,
the institution of federal protection of the individual's private interests") (emphasis in orig-
inal). But see SEXUAL FREEOM, supra note 41, at 27-30 (author argues that in the case of a
vagueness attack on sodomy laws the underlying policy is to assure statutory language clear
enough to give notice to lay persons). Concern with the excessive discretion that police of-
ficers and courts may exercise in their enforcement functions was voiced by the United
States Supreme Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Justice
Douglas articulated the Court's objection to the vagrancy statute in issue, by stating:
"Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance-poor people, noncon-
formists, dissenters, idlers-may be required to comport themselves according to the life-
style deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here, there
are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the
scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It
furnishes a convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting
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knowledged Pryor's contention that section 647(a) was discrimina-
torily enforced against homosexual males and stated that "[t]hree
studies of law enforcement in Los Angeles County indicate that the
overwhelming majority of arrests of Penal Code Section 647, subdi-
vision (a), involved male homosexuals.
'142
The court's recognition that enforcement of section 647(a) is
primarily aimed at homosexuals is important. Statutes designed to
regulate "deviant" sexual behavior are particularly vulnerable to
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Despite the fact that on
their face these statutes are generally nondiscriminatory, the devi-
ant sexual conduct proscribed often becomes synonymous with ho-
mosexual conduct, either as a result of police enforcement or of
judicial fiat.
143
Section 647(a) is typical of these repressive statutes.144 The
officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."' Id. at 170 (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1939)).
142. 25 Cal. 3d at 252, 599 P.2d at 644, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The three studies to that
the court was referring were: Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An
Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 643 (1966); Copilow & Coleman, Enforcement of Section 647(a) of the California
Penal Code by the Los Angeles Police Department (1972) (unpublished report) (on file with
the Hastings Law Journal). Toy, Update: Enforcement of Section 647(a) of the California
Penal Code by the Los Angeles Police Department (1974) (unpublished report) (on ifie with
the Hastings Law Journal).
143. Note, Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults-Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206, 214
(1971). This may result from the fact that to a heterosexual police officer and a heterosexual
judge, a homosexual act may be more detestible than a heterosexual act. See Hefner, The
Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40 U. CoLo. L. REv. 199, 215 (1968). Further, laws enforced
in an antihomosexual manner often lead to increased violence upon homosexuals. Acts such
as mugging, robbery, and blackmail are often carried out with impunity against homosexuals
because the homosexual victims are unlikely to turn to the same law enforcement officials
who tacitly approve of the acts. The National Committee for Sexual Civil Liberties asserts
that "a growing number of young hoodlums in America make a practice of 'queer-baiting' [a
term referring to the process of looking for lone males believed to be homosexual and per-
forming acts of violence on them] comfortable in the knowledge that so-called homosexuals
will almost never call upon the police for protection and that they really cannot do so ....
These youths take their cue from the laws and from the intolerant spirit that brings about
and perpetuates such laws." Amicus, supra note 95, at 18.
Closely related to this physical violence are blackmail and extortion, which are often a
result of antihomosexual enforced laws. See id. at 17. See also E. KIESTER, CRIMES wrrH No
VIcTIMs (1972); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1006
(1979); Decoy Enforcement, supra note 115, at 278. The violence results directly from laws
which invite capricious enforcement and which permit their use "for purposes of harass-
ment, for satisfying personal grudges, or as a means of filling... monthly arrest quotas
when the need arises." Amicus, supra note 95, at 17.
144. The susceptibility of § 647(a) to discriminatory enforcement was a principal fac-
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U.C.L.A. Project, an exhaustive examination of the effect of Cali-
fornia criminal law on adult homosexuals,'145 showed that approxi-
mately 90-95% of all homosexual sex related arrests were for viola-
tions of section 647(a).146 This figure was not a reflection of a high
incidence of lewd public acts committed by homosexuals, but the
result of selective enforcement by the police.147
tor considered by the California State Bar when it recommended the section's repeal. The
delegates to the 1976 annual convention approved a conference report which explained that
subsections (a), (b), and (d) of § 647 were so susceptible to discriminatory enforcement and
imposed such severe punishment for acts which were often no more than speech or a com-
municative gesture that repeal of the subdivisions was the only viable remedy. Conference
of Delegates Approves Sexual Orientation Proposal at California State Bar Association
1976 Annual Meeting, 2 SEXUAL L. REP. 66 (1976).
145. Project, supra note 3. The study was described as "an analysis of the functioning
of the criminal law as a vehicle for the regulation of private morality." Id. at 655 (emphasis
original).
The validity of the findings of the Project were sustantiated in separate studies conduct
in 1972 and in 1974. See Copilow & Coleman, Investigation and Report of Enforcement of
Section 647(a) of the California Penal Code by the Los Angeles Police Department (1972)
(unpublished report) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal); Toy, Update: Enforcement of
Section 647(a) of the California Penal Code by the Los Angeles Police Department (1974)
(unpublished report) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal). These later studies revealed
that the few heterosexuals charged with § 647(a) violations often are permitted to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, such as Penal Code § 415 (disturbing the peace), which does not
require violators to register as sex offenders under Penal Code § 290.
146. Project, supra note 3, at 691 n.30. At the time the U.C.L.A. study was completed,
two now repealed Penal Code sections were still in effect: § 286 proscribed engaging in acts
of sodomy, and § 288a prohibited engaging in acts of oral copulation. Clearly, engaging in
these acts in public would constitute engaging in lewd or dissolute conduct under § 647(a) as
well. Id. at 684.
Of those charged with felonious homosexual activity less than one percent ultimately
received felony dispositions. Id. at 783 & n.81. The courts were reluctant to impose the
harsh punishment of a felony conviction: "The systematic disposition of adult consensual
homosexual offenders as misdemeanants by sentence can be attributed to three factors: (1)
Judicial recognition of the inefficacy of the criminal law as applied to adult consensual ho-
mosexuality; (2) Judicial acknowledgement of the inappropriateness of incarceration as a
technique for proscribing homosexual behavior; and (3) Judicial evaluation of public consen-
sual homosexual activity as a nuisance rather than as a menace to the community. Id. at
783. Yet, it must be remembered that a person convicted of a § 647(a) violation is forced to
register as a sex offender for the remainder of his or her life under Penal Code § 290. See
Comment, Sex Offender Registration for Section 647 Disorderly Conduct Convictions is
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 13 SAN DIGo L. REv. 391 (1976). See also Project, supra
note 3, at 736-38.
147. See generally Project, supra note 3, at 690-734; Decoy Enforcement, supra note
115, at 272-75. For a discussion of the clandestine nature of most homosexual contacts, see
notes 117-19, 133-35 & accompanying text supra.
The great discrepancy between § 647(a) prosecutions of heterosexuals and homosexuals
can partially be explained by the lack of female undercover police officers employed to make
§ 647(a) arrests, see Project, supra note 3, at 693 n.46., the aggressive nature in which ho-
mosexual conduct is sought out by the police, id. at 690-734, and the tendency of law en-
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Conduct which the police would not consider lewd or dissolute
if performed by a heterosexual couple has been so labeled when'
performed by a homosexual couple. In the 1976 case of People v.
Rodrigues148 two men were prosecuted and convicted under section
647(a) for kissing late at night in the privacy of their car which was
parked near a public rest area. The case was affirmed on appeal
despite the officer's admission that he "probably" would not have
made the arrest had a heterosexual couple been involved.149 This,
the court said, was not sufficient to establish invidious discrimina-
tion.150 "Lewd or dissolute" conduct was thus interpreted to con-
note any public demonstration of homosexual affection, even
though similar public heterosexual conduct would not have been
unlawful. The Pryor court cited Rodrigues as "another striking il-
lustration of discriminatory enforcement of section 647, subdivi-
sion (a)."
151
In addition to its recognition of the impropriety of statutes
that are discriminatorily applied against homosexuals, Pryor is also
important for the limitations it sets upon the application of the
solicitation portion of section 647(a). Because of the unobstrusive
nature of many solicitations, the potential for misconstruction of
the often ambiguous proposals, and the immense personal damage
that can result from an alleged violation of section 647(a), it is ex-
tremely important that strict safeguards be imposed. If Pryor is
interpreted to require the actual presence of a potentially offend-
able person for a section 647(a) violation, these dangers are some-
what diminished. Moreover, by limiting the solicitation portion of
section 647(a) to "lewd" acts to be performed at the time and place
of the solicitation, the actual intent of the actor is easier to
determine.
This does not, however, dispose of the problems inherent in
such a solicitation proscription. One author has remarked that "ei-
ther subconsciously or consciously a decoy policeman may mistake
the facts . . . . In addition, the policeman whose assignment is to
find homosexuals may have a distorted impression of the subtle
interchange which occurred, since he knows that he must fully jus-
forcement officials and judges to equate lewd conduct with homosexual conduct, see note
143 & accompanying text supra.
148. 63 Cal. App. Supp. 1, 133 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1976).
149. Id. at 5, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
150. Id.
151. 25 Cal. 3d at 252, 599 P.2d at 644, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
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tify his decision to make an arrest."' 52 This concern was voiced by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Kelly v.
United States,153 in which petitioner was arrested for allegedly
soliciting an undercover police officer. The two men had engaged in
a conversation about several topics culminating with an invitation
to the officer to go up to Kelly's apartment. There was a discrep-
ancy in the testimony of the parties as to the purpose of the invita-
tion, Kelly claiming it was for a social drink and the arresting of-
ficer alleging he was invited to perform lewd sexual acts. The court
realized the damage occurring from the accusation itself,
explaining:
While the enforcement of this particular statute [inviting for a
lewd or immoral purpose] must seek the prevention of the *of-
fense, it must also seek to prevent unwarranted irreparable de-
struction of reputations, and it must seek to prevent the equally
criminal offense of blackmail; it must not foster conditions or
practices which make easy and encourage that offense.'"
There is little indication that the parameters of an unlawful
solicitation will be either less ambiguous or not as easily miscon-
strued after Pryor, even if an offendable person need be present
when the act is to be performed. The "credibility contest" between
the arresting officer and the accused may be reduced to a contro-
versy over the character of the situs where the lewd act was to be
performed. The Pryor opinion did not discuss the credibility argu-
ment. Pryor insisted he had never mentioned a parking lot as the
location of a sex act, while the arresting officer contended that he
did. There was no opportunity for corroboration of either party's
testimony because no other persons had heard the conversation. In
such a situation, a judge or jury may act out of prejudice to the
arrested party or deference to the officer in rendering a verdict.
Furthermore, the undercover officer may still misconstrue a solici-
tation, believing that the act solicited was to be performed "then
and there," while the solicitor actually had other intentions.
Kelly recognized the dangers inherent in such a credibility
battle and set forth three recommendations for the courts to follow
in sex offense cases: (1) when the charge rests upon the testimony
of one accusing witness, the testimony should be received and con-
152. Decoy Enforcement, supra note 115, at 268 (footnotes omitted). See Project,
supra note 3, at 696.
153. 194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
154. Id. at 154.
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sidered with great caution; (2) evidence of the accused's good char-
acter should be readily admissible; and (3) the court should require
corroboration as to the circumstances surrounding the solicitation,
such as the presence of the parties at the alleged time and place.
155
The court admonished that if these recommendations do not serve
to eliminate abuse, "another opportunity can be taken to establish
other protections."1
56
While the Kelly court's recognition of the problem is admira-
ble, the suggestions it offered are inadequate. An issue as emotion-
ally charged as a sex offense requires more than "great caution"; it
is unlikely that a cautionary instruction will adequately safeguard
against either juror bias against homosexuals or deference accorded
to a law enforcement official. In addition, the use of character wit-
nesses only serves to escalate the embarrassment of one falsely ac-
cused. Further, a defendant should no longer be forced to combat
charges of lewdness with evidence of heterosexuality. Finally, re-
quiring corroboration of surrounding circumstances is of little aid;
it is a relatively easy requisite to meet'57 for it is probable that the
accused will have been where the officer states he or she was. The
concern should be with the content of the solicitation, not with the
location of the parties.
Requiring corroboration of a solicitation offense is not a notion
foreign to California jurisprudence. Penal Code section 653f re-
quires corroboration of the solicitation for the felonies enumerated
therein.15 A section 647(a) conviction, though not a felony, re-
quires the violator to register as a sex offender for the remainder of
his or her life.' 59 A section 647(a) solicitation charge therefore mer-
its, at a minimum, a corroboration requirement equal to that of
section 653f.l e0
155. Id. at 154-55.
156. Id. at 155.
157. Decoy Enforcement, supra note 115, at 280.
158. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653f(d) (West Supp. 1980) states: "An offense charged in
violation of subdivision (a), (b) or (c) must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or
of one witness and corroborating circumstances."
159. See note 146 supra.
160. In 1977 such a requirement was introduced in the California Legislature as part
of an omnibus criminal law reform package. The relevant portion of S.B. 27 (1977) would
have added the same corroboration requirement found in § 653f(d) to the solicitation por-
tion of § 647(a). The bill passed the Senate but died in the Assembly Committee on Crimi-
nal Justice. There appeared to be no strong opposition to the corroboration requirement
since the bill was never amended throughout the lengthy proceedings. See SENATE FINAL
HISTORY 30 (1977-1978).
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The dangers created by the solicitation portion of section
647(a)-selective and discriminatory enforcement, severe character
damage resulting from the charge of solicitation, and unsavory po-
lice conduct-outweigh the benefits to society that the solicitation
portion of section 647(a) provides after the limitations were placed
upon it in Pryor. The value of a proscription against soliciting a
lewd act to be performed when other potentially offendable per-
sons are present is so minor and the dangers attending the misuse
of such a proscription are so great that all references to solicitation
should be deleted from section 647(a). 61
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court's thorough vagueness analysis
of Penal Code section 647(a) provides a model for judicial statu-
tory construction. The tripartite examination of the statutory lan-
guage, legislative history, and prior decisions assures that a statute
is sufficiently specific to meet constitutional standards. Of signifi-
cant importance, as well, is the court's concern for the potential
The distinction between the corroboration requirement of § 653f and the lack of such a
requirement in § 647(a) may be challenged as an equal protection violation. See Newland v.
Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 566 P.2d 254, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1977). In Newland,
the court held a law, providing for a process by which a convicted felon would get a teaching
credential reinstated while a convicted misdemeanant could not, violated equal protection.
Id. at 714, 566 P.2d at 259, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 625. Both the felon and the misdemeanant in
Newland had been convicted of sex offenses.
Some commentators have recommended requiring undercover police officers to use tape
recorders in order to obtain corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Project, supra note 3, at 699-
700. Although this method would be an improvement over the present situation, recording
the exact words spoken often may be inadequate. There will be situations where hearing the
words without understanding their context could be misleading. Further, tape recordings
fall to register the many nonverbal communications which often accompany a solicitation.
See notes 133-34 & accompanying text supra.
161. Senator Sieroty introduced such a bill, S.B. 538, in the California Senate on
March 12, 1979. The bill would have deleted all references to solicitation in § 647(a) and (d).
In support of the bill, a report for the Committee on the Judiciary explained that the pur-
pose was to "curtail entrapment of gays by police vice officers." The report cited the
U.C.L.A. Project, noting that in Los Angeles, 96.9% of the arrests involved male homosexual
activity, 95% involved use of plainclothed vice officers acting as decoys, and 98% of the
cases involved no private citizen complaint, the arresting officer being the only complaining
witness. The bill died in the Senate Judiciary Committee on a 4-4 vote.
Citizens would still be protected from persistent and highly offensive solicitations if the
solicitation portion of § 647(a) was repealed. These bothersome solicitations are proscribed
by CAL. PENAL CODE § 415(d) (West Supp. 1980), which states: "Any person who uses offen-
sive wordsin a public place which are inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent
reaction [is guilty of a misdemeanor]."
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discriminatory enforcement of a vague statute.
The court's definition of "lewd or dissolute" manifests judicial
recognition of the limited role the government should take in the
area of sexual morality. The requirement of the presence of a po-
tentially offendable person limits the function of section 647(a) to
preventing harm to third persons. 162 The effectiveness of this limi-
tation will depend on how the courts clarify the ambiguities inher-
ent in the definition of "lewd or dissolute" as promulgated by the
California Supreme Court in Pryor.
162. See generally Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Com-
parative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345 (1965-
66); Note, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the
Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581 (1967).
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